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Policing the Persian Gulf: Protecting
United States Interests and Freedom of
Navigation Through Military Force
INTRODUCTION
In 1986, Iran and Iraq attacked over one hundred ships in the
Persian Gulf during the war between those two nations. Over thirty
ships were attacked in the first three months of 19871 and between
May 1, 1987 and July, 1987, Iran attacked five vessels of non-belliger-
ent nations navigating in international waters. 2 On July 31, 1987, the
Bridgeton, a Kuwaiti owned supertanker flying the United States
flag, 3 struck an unanchored underwater mine in international waters
while being escorted by the United States Navy.4 During the first four
months of 1988, Iran continued its aggressive tactics and attacked
fifty-one vessels.5 Iran laid underwater mines in sea-lanes of the Per-
sian Gulf 6 and employed speed boats armed with missiles to facilitate
its attacks on neutral vessels in an attempt to frustrate the freedom of
navigation.
7
In order to protect the interest of the United States, Congress
initially authorized the reflagging of eleven Kuwaiti vessels with the
United States flag to provide these ships with United States military
protection against Iranian attacks while on the high seas.8 Other na-
tions followed the United States in reflagging Kuwaiti vessels and de-
ploying their navies to the Persian Gulf to insure the freedom of
1. Statement by Assistant Secretary of State Murphy (May 19, 1987), 87 Dep't St. Bull.,
No. 2124, at 60 (July 1987). The non-belligerent vessels which were attacked by Iran were all
engaged in commerce with Kuwait. Id. Iran facilitated these attacks through the use of small
boats armed with light weapons and helicopters launched from Iranian warships. Id.
2. Id.
3. Anderson, A Sting in the Gulf, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 3, 1987, at 24.
4. Id. Although the damage caused by the mine was minimal, the "detonation under-
neath any of the more vulnerable warships might have increased the American death toll be-
yond the 37 who died in the Iraqi attack on the USS Stark. Id.
5. L.A. Times, Apr. 23, 1988, Part I, at 12, col. 1.
6. Watson, The Mines of August, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 24, 1987, at 22. It is believed that
Iran also deployed mines in the Gulf of Oman and off the coast of Saudi Arabia. Id. A
Swedish owned supply ship, the Anita, struck an underwater contact mine in the Gulf of
Oman, and sank, killing one and five others were listed as missing. Id.
7. Id. It was estimated that Iran had 1,000 mines in reserve with a capability of holding
the free flow of commerce at its mercy. Id.
8. Statement of Assistant Secretary of State Murphy, supra note 2, at 61.
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navigation. By late 1987, the Soviet Union reflagged three Kuwaiti
vessels9 and Great Britain had two Kuwaiti ships under its protec-
tion.' By mid-October, 1987, Western European navies had
deployed more military ships in the Persian Gulf region than the
United States. 11
The United States attacked Iranian military vessels, oil platforms
and territories between 1987 and 1988 in its effort to secure its free-
dom of navigation.12 The first incident of overt United States military
involvement took place on September 18, 1987 when the United
States, a non-belligerent to the Iran-Iraq War,13 attacked an Iranian
naval vessel, Iran Ajr. At the time of attack the Iran Ajr was de-
ploying underwater mines in gulf sea-lanes.' 4 Five Iranian sailors
were killed and twenty-six were captured, and later returned to Iran.
Ultimately, the United States destroyed the Iran Ajr. 15
United States policy of escorting vessels flagged by the United
States failed to prevent Iran from mining the Persian Gulf.16 On
April 14, 1988, an Iranian planted underwater mine struck and crip-
pled the United States frigate Samuel B. Roberts.17 In retaliation, the
United States destroyed Iranian oil platforms at Sassan and Sirri.1
8
United States military personnel were sensitive to any Iranian military
action during this period. As Iranian naval vessels approached
United States forces, the United States either destroyed or damaged
these vessels. 19 When the battle of April 18, 1988 ended, Iran had lost
9. Armacost, US.Policy in the Persian Gulf and Kuwaiti Reflagging, 87 Dep't St. Bull.,
No. 2125, at 78 (Aug. 1987). The United States shared the burden of policing the Persian Gulf
with Japan, the Soviet Union and Western Europe. Id. This cooperation went beyond protect-
ing neutral ships through naval escorts and included a coordinated attempt to achieve peace
through diplomatic channels. Id.
10. Infra note 49, at 44.
11. They're not all wimps, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 26, 1987, at 60. In the Persian Gulf
region, France deployed fifteen naval vessels; Great Britain deployed ten naval vessels; Italy
deployed eight military vessels; and Belgium/Holland deployed five naval vessels; and as of
October, 1987, the United States deployed 35 naval vessels. Id.
12. L.A. Times, July 4, 1988, Part I, at 9.
13. Armacost, supra note 9 "[T]he United States remains formally neutral in the war.
With one aberration, we have sold weaponry to neither side; we will not sell to either." Supra
note 9, at 80.
14. Watson, A United States Ambush in the Gulf, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 5, 1987, at 24.
United States military helicopter personnel witnessed the actual deployment of mines from
Iran Ajr into the Persian Gulf. Id.
15. Id.
16. L.A. Times, Apr. 9, 1988, Part I, at 1, col. 5.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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six naval vessels. 20
The United States initially attacked the oil platforms in response
to the assault on the Samuel B. Roberts.21 Pentagon officials claimed
the attack upon the platforms was targeted because it was least likely
to provoke an escalation. 22 While such action was stronger than a
symbolic show of force, it was less aggressive than attacks on military
or civilian targets on Iranian soil, likely to result in high casualties
and a worldwide outcry. 23
In response to Iran's continued harassment of vessels, the United
States extended its military aid to neutral vessels.24 President Reagan
authorized the United States to aid neutral vessels under attack.25
Congress did not voice any opposition to the extension in policy.26
This policy did not authorize United States naval vessels to escort
neutral ships, but rather to aid them only if they were under attack
and the United States was in a position to help.27 By aiding neutral
vessels, the United States attempted to throw Iran off guard and curb
Iranian attacks.28 The prior policy of aiding only vessels flying the
flag of the United States allowed Iran to attack neutral vessels in plain
view of United States military personnel. 29
As the war between Iran and Iraq comes to a temporary conclu-
sion in 1988, this Comment questions the United States policy regard-
ing the use of military force to insure the freedom of navigation. The
specific actions 30 taken by the United States between 1987 and 1988
20. Id.
21. Id. at 7, col. 3.
22. Id. at 7, col. 2.
23. Id.
24. L.A. Times, Apr. 23, 1988, Part I, at 1, col. 5.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. A chronology of major military events in the Persian Gulf naval warfare that in-
volved the United States from 1980 to July, 1988: September 22, 1980, Iran and Iraq declared
war and the United States declared its neutrality. On December 10, 1986, Kuwait requested
from the United States protection against Iranian attacks in the Persian Gulf through a flag-
ging program. On March 7, 1987, the United States offered military escorts to eleven Kuwaiti
tankers when Iran deployed Chinese made Silkworm missiles near the strategic Strait of Hor-
muz. On May 7, 1987, Iraq accidentally attacked the USS Stark and killed thirty-seven mili-
tary men. On July 24, 1987, The Bridgeton, a United States flagged Kuwaiti tanker, was
damaged by a mine while in the Persian Gulf. On August 20, 1987, Iran admitted the placing
of mines in the Gulf. Iran claimed that the placing of mines in the sea-lanes of the Persian
Gulf would protect its borders. On September 21, 1987, the United States captured an Iranian
1989]
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will be used to analyze the general policies pursued by the United
States. Part I of this Comment is an examination of the United States
presence in the Persian Gulf; the escorting of foreign ships flying the
flag of the United States, and the military actions taken therein. The
central concern addressed in Part I is whether the military actions
taken by the United States were within the bounds of international
law.
Part II addresses the constitutional authorization for President
Reagan's use of naval forces in the Persian Gulf. More specifically,
whether the Commander-in-Chief Clause 31 provided President Rea-
gan with the authority to use military force in the Persian Gulf. This
Comment will further explore whether Congress could have invoked
the War Powers Resolution3 2 or the To Declare War Clause33 to limit
the President's use of military force.
vessel laying mines in the gulf. Three Iranian sailors were killed and twenty-six were captured.
On October 8, 1987, four Iranian patrol boats fired at United States armed forces. United
States naval forces attacked and sank at least one of the vessels. On October 16, 1987, Sea Isle
City was struck by an Iranian Silkworm missile in Kuwaiti waters. Eighteen crewmen were
injured in this first Iranian attack on a refiagged Kuwaiti ship. On October 19, 1987, the
United States Navy attacked two of Iran's offshore oil platforms in retaliation for Iran's Octo-
ber 16, 1987 attack of the Sea Isle City. On October 22, 1987, an Iranian Silkworm hit a
Kuwaiti loading terminal for tankers. On November 1, 1987, the United States Navy attacked
three Arab civilian fishing boats it had mistaken for Iranian patrol boats. In February, 1988,
the United States reduced its naval presence in the Persian Gulf to twenty-nine vessels. On
April 14, 1988, a mine damaged the Navy frigate Samuel B. Roberts. Ten members of the
crew were injured. On April 18, 1988, United States forces retaliated for the attack upon the
Samuel B. Roberts and attacked two Iranian oil platforms. The United States' attack fueled
daylong battles where Iran lost six naval vessels. One United States Marine helicopter was lost
and two United States servicemen were killed. On July 2, 1988, a United States frigate came to
the aid of Danish supertanker fired on by Iranian gunboats. On July 3, 1988, the United States
destroyed two patrol boats that fired on a United States helicopter near the Strait of Hormuz
and the USS Vincennes mistakenly destroyed an Iranian civilian airliner. L.A. Times, July 4,
1988, Part I, at 9, col. 6.
31. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into
the actual Service of the United States .. " Id.
32. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1973).
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. "The Congress shall have Power... To declare war,
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water." Id.
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PART I: A NATION'S RIGHT TO USE MILITARY FORCE UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Limits on the Use of Military Force by Nations Engaged in War
Although the United Nations Charter prohibits the use of mili-
tary force as a means of settling international disputes, 34 Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter provides an exception. Article 51 states:
"nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." 35
Between the general prohibition of military action and the per-
missible use of military force in self-defense lay rules of customary
international law by which nations must conduct warfare. For exam-
ple, the Hague Convention (XIII) of 1907 Concerning The Rights and
Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War mandates that "[b]elligerents
are bound to respect the sovereign rights of neutral Powers and to
abstain, in neutral territory or neutral waters, from any act which
would, if knowingly permitted by any Power, constitute a violation of
neutrality. '
36
The Hague Convention (VIII) of 190737 severely restricts the use
of automatic contact mines. 38 It is forbidden "[t]o lay unanchored
34. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. "All Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any State .. " Id.
35. Combacau, The Exception of Self-Defense in UN. Practice, in THE CURRENT LEGAL
REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 9 (1986).
Art. 51 states a "right", or, to be more exact, an exception to a legal obligation, and it
is as the "exception of self-defence" that we shall henceforward refer to this so called
right. Implicitly linked to the rule it derogates from, Art. 51 need say nothing about
the content of the exception, which can be deduced without difficulty from the terms
of Art. 2(4): it is evident that the use of force which the exception permits is the
same as that which the rule forbids. The text only deals with the legal regulation of
self-defense, that is the fundamental and procedural conditions necessary for the ex-
ception to be operative.
Id. at 11.
36. The Hague Convention (XIII) of 1907 Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers in Naval War, art. 1 [hereinafter, The Hague Convention (XIII)].
37. The Hague Convention (VIII) of 1907 Relative to the Laying of Automatic Subma-
rine Contact Mines [hereinafter The Hague Convention (VIII)]. Although the Hague Conven-
tion was not signed by the existing government of Iran, the Convention recognizes that the
international community highly disfavors placing underwater mines in international waters.
38. Thirty-eight nations signed The Hague Convention (VIII), one of which was Persia
(Iran), and twenty nations ratified the treaty including the United States. The Hague Conven-
tion (VIII), supra note 37, art. 13.
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contact mines. . .. ,"39 It is also forbidden "[to lay automatic contact
mines off the coast and ports of the enemy, with the sole object of
intercepting commercial shipping." 40 It is irrelevant that the above
provision refers to the "coast and ports of the enemy." The fact that
Kuwait is not a belligerent in the Iran-Iraq War will not prevent the
application of the above principles. Since the Hague Convention for-
bids the laying of mines in an enemy's coast or port, it may be reason-
ably inferred that the laying of mines off the coasts or ports of neutral
nations is also forbidden. The deployment of underwater contact
mines in neutral waters clearly restricts international commerce and
defeats the purpose of the Hague Convention.4'
The Hague Convention also stipulates that "[w]hen anchored au-
tomatic contact mines are employed, every possible precaution must
be taken for the security of peaceful shipping. ' 42 Iran has continued
to disobey this provision by insisting an "invisible hand" has placed
the mines in sea-lanes. 43 Furthermore, Iran has attempted to keep the
location of the mines a secret by placing them in sea-lanes during the
night, under the cover of darkness.44
The policy reason behind the prohibition of laying automatic un-
derwater contact mines is to encourage and facilitate international
commerce during both peace and wartime.
"Seeing that, although the existing position of affairs makes it im-
possible to forbid the employment of automatic submarine contact
mines, it is nevertheless desirable to restrict and regulate their em-
ployment in order to mitigate the severity of war and to ensure, as
far as possible, to peaceful navigation the security to which it is
entitled, despite the existence of war .... ,,45
Iraq attacked Iran in November, 1980 and both nations were in a
state of declared war until 1988. Arguably, Iran deployed underwater
mines in the Persian Gulf as part of its military strategy against Iraq,
attempting to disrupt Iraq's access to sea-lanes to prevent Iraq from
marketing its oil. By denying Iraq revenue from its oil production,
Iran sought to destroy Iraq's ability to finance its military effort."
39. Id. art. 1, para. 1.
40. Id. art. 2.
41. The Hague Convention (XIII), supra note 36, Purpose of Convention.
42. The Hague Convention (VIII), supra note 37, art. 3.
43. A Day in the Gulf, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 26, 1987, at 50.
44. Id.
45. The Hague Convention (XIII), supra note 36, Purpose of Convention.
46. From Iran's viewpoint, the deployment of underwater mines in the Persian Gulf did
[Vol. 11:171
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Iran's justification for mining sea-lanes of the Persian Gulf fails to
account for the fact that Iraq started to use the Persian Gulf as a
means of transporting its oil only after Iraq's war with Iran ended in
1988. 47
Placing underwater mines in sea-lanes used for international
commerce frustrates the free use of the high seas and defeats the poli-
cies which the Hague Convention seeks to achieve. For example, the
cost of insurance for sailing ships in the Persian Gulf has increased
astronomically and there is the threat of a de facto closure of the Per-
sian Gulf because the maritime industry fears attack.48 A de jure or
de facto closure of the Straits of Hormuz would be devastating to the
economic interest of the United States and Western Europe. The gulf
countries supply twenty-five percent of all oil in the petroleum market
and they have sixty-three percent of the world's known oil reserves.
4 9
Thirty percent of Western Europe's oil consumption came from the
gulf region in 1986.50 While only five percent of United States' oil
consumption came from the gulf region in 1986, by the mid-1990's
that figure may double. 51
B. Genuine Link Requirements
The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea 52 stipu-
not violate any rights available to Kuwait because, arguably, Kuwait was not neutral in the
Iran-Iraq War. Kuwait transported oil from Iraq which assisted Iraq's ability to finance its
war effort against Iran. Iran could argue that Kuwait's actions were in direct violation of the
Hague Convention. "The supply, in any manner, directly or indirectly, by a neutral Power to
a belligerent Power, of war-ships, ammunition, or war material of any kind whatever, is forbid-
den." The Hague Convention (XIII), supra note 36, art. 6. However, Kuwait was not a signa-
tory to the Hague Convention. Hence, the Convention did not bind Kuwait.
47. A.P. Plus News, August 20, 1988.
48. After United States engaged with Iran in the Persian Gulf on April 18, 1988, Lloyds
of London doubled their insurance rate for ships passing through the gulf. L.A. Times, Apr.
23, 1988, Part I, at 12, col. 1.
49. Schloesser, U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf, 87 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2127, at 38 (Oct.
1987).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Although the United States is not a signatory of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea 1982 (also referred to as the LOS Convention), the United States has the
right to the freedom of navigation on the high seas. Ambassador James L. Malone, Chairman
in 1982 of the U.S. Delegation to the Third Conference stated that:
[N]on-parties to the LOS Convention will continue to have navigational rights and
freedoms recognized in customary international law, including all of the navigational
rights and freedoms recognized in the Convention .... This is because the Conven-
tion cannot deprive non-parties of their existing rights, either commercial or military.
The United States, in particular, will not alter the operations of its maritime forces as
a result of its decision not to sign the LOS Convention.
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lates that all nations have the right to sail ships on the high seas,53
without interference by another nation.54 A nation has the right to
insure ships flying under its flag free access to the high seas and to
protect the freedom of navigation."
Ships belonging to foreign nations or foreign companies may fly
the flag of another nation.5 6 The 1982 Convention delegates to each
nation the power to "fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality
to ships ... and for the right to fly its flag." 57 Under United States
law if foreign vessels meet ownership and technical requirements,
then they can be registered under the United States flag. 58
The United States Coast Guard inspected the eleven Kuwaiti
vessels reflagged with the flag of the United States to determine that
they complied with United States technical requirements for registra-
tion. Although the crew members were not required to be United
States citizens, because the eleven Kuwaiti vessels did not stop at any
ports in the United States, the captain of each vessel was a United
States citizen as required. 9 Because Kuwait satisfied United States
registration procedures as required by the 1982 Convention, establish-
ing a "genuine link" between the United States and Kuwait, the
United States legally provided these eleven Kuwaiti vessels with naval
protection. 6o
Wainwright, Navigation Through Three Straits in the Middle East: Effects on the United States
of Being a Nonparty to the 1982 Convention on the Law ofthe Sea, 18 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
361, 376 (1986).
53. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, art. 90, reprinted in I
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 244 (M.
Nordquist ed. 1985) [hereinafter 1982 Convention].
54. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 1071 (1962).
"The claim to equal and unrestricted access to, and enjoyment of, the oceans is of course the
most important of all the claims of states, and the most fundamental community policy is that
of protecting this claim." Id.
55. Id. at 1072. "While the more limited modem assertions of authority also raise issues
involving freedom of the seas, it is now taken for granted that ships of all states may traverse
the ocean free of prohibition by any state or group of states." Id.
56. Id.
57. 1982 Convention, supra. note 53, art. 91.
Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the
registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the
nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine
link between the State and the ship.
Id.
58. Statement by Assistant Secretary of State Murphy, supra note 2, at 60.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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C. Principles of Self-Defense
Under the United Nations Charter all nations have the right to
use military force in self-defense.61 A nation using such force must
notify the Security Council of the United Nations.62 Some scholars
argue that self defense, as defined by the United Nations Charter, is
ambiguous and subject to abuse.63 However, the use of military force
in self-defense is permissible under customary principles of interna-
tional law. Three elements characterize the use of force as self-de-
fense, as opposed to an offensive armed attack: (1) grounds for the use
of force; (2) the aim of the force is to repulse the assailant; and (3) the
level of force used in self-defense is proportional to the force used by
the aggressor.64
The first element, grounds for the use of force, is established
when one nation reacts to another nation's armed attacks.65 The na-
tion that acts only after initial aggression by another country is using
force as self-defense. 66 Armed attack is also used in Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter. Armed attack may include acts of aggres-
sion,67 but the United Nations Charter has failed to adequately define
armed attack.
68
Scholars interpret the second element, repulse the assailant, as
61. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
62. Combacau, supra note 35, at 11.
63. J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 243-44 (1954). "[S]elf-
defence under general international law is as vague as it is unquestioned, and as liable to abuse
in its application as it is indispensable in the present phase of international society." Id.
64. Combacau, supra note 35, at 20-25.
65. Id. at 20.
66. Id. This is a more complicated process than it would seem. As Combacau states:
It would seem that nothing could be easier than to determine, when confronted with
two acts of the same nature attributable to two States, which is lawful and which is
not. All that need be done is to establish the facts of the case and the state which
came first and which second. In practice, however, things are not so simple, because
it is often hard to decide what the first unlawful act was.
Id.
67. Id. at 22. The definition that is given to "armed attack" will determine the scope of
self-defense.
[11f one admitted that armed attack as in Art. 51 was the same thing either as "ag-
gression" or "use of force" as defined in these resolutions, this would mean a consid-
erable extension of the grounds for self-defense, because they refer to forbidden uses
of force not covered by the concept of armed attack.
Id.
. 68. Id. at 23. "This notion [armed attack] remains as indeterminate legally as it was
when the Charter was drawn up, and can be freely construed case by case by its authorized
interpreters." Id.
1989]
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"force used to reinstate a legal right that was taken away." 69 This
definition requires that there be a "necessity" to use self-defense.
Some scholars have defined necessity in absolute terms: "[linstant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for delib-
eration."'70 The strict definition of necessity may be designed to pro-
tect against extravagant claims.
71
The third element, the rule of proportionality, requires that the
amount of force used in self-defense must be proportional to the force
used by the aggressor. "The customary right of self-defense involved
the assumption that the force used must be proportionate to the
threat.' 72 The force may not involve anything "unreasonable or ex-
cessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be
limited by that necessity, and kept within it.' 73 The rule of propor-
tionality attempts to limit the use of force to only what is essential for
protecting rights which are under threat by the aggressor. This is an
attempt to eliminate arbitrary decisions to use force.74
Every nation has the right to use military force to protect its
right to freedom of navigation on the high seas. "[T]he use of force
... to guarantee free navigation beyond a three-mile limit... would
seem to be at the most appropriate areas for the threat or application
of force.' 5 Furthermore, scholars have argued that a nation may use
force to reinstate a legal right which was unjustifiably taken from
them. "The essence of self-defense is a wrong done, a breach of a
69. Id. at 25. Combacau argues, "[i]f in particular self-defence cannot legally have any
aim other than to repulse the assailant, this must be considered as the only criterion for judg-
ing the lawfulness of measures which claim to be performed in self-defence." Id.
70. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 217
(1961)(quoting Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox, Apr. 24, 1841, in 29 British and Foreign State Papers
1129, 1138 (1840-41)) [hereinafter McDoUGAL & FELICIANO].
71. Id.
72. I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 261
(1963).
73. Id.
74. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 70, at 218. "What remains to be stressed is
that reasonableness in [a] particular context does not mean arbitrariness in decision but in fact
its exact opposite, the disciplined ascription of policy import to varying factors in appraising
their operational and functional significance for community goals in given instances of coer-
cion." Id.
75. Knight, Alternatives to a Law of the Sea Treaty, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: U.S.
INTERESTS AND ALTERNATIVES 133, 144-42 (1976). But see I. BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at
283-86. Browniie rejects the right of nations to use force to protect existing legal rights.
Brownlie argues that to use force to protect a nation's rights is contrary to international princi-
ples developed after World War II which hold that nations must settle disputes by peaceful
means. Id.
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legal duty owed to the state acting in self-defense." '76
D. Anticipatory Attack as Self-Defense
Under customary international law, a nation has the right to em-
ploy self-defense in anticipation of an imminent attack.77 "A State
may defend itself, by preventive means if in its conscientious judg-
ment necessary, against attack by another State, threat of attack, or
preparations or other conduct from which an intention to attack may
reasonably be apprehended [sic]. '"78 The policy reason for this rule
includes a belief that it is illogical to wait until attacked to protect
one's rights.
79
Scholars supporting the Doctrine of Anticipatory Self-Defense
maintain that the legitimacy of this privilege is not eliminated by Arti-
cle 51 of the United Nations Charter.80 As Professor McDugal states:
There is not the slightest evidence that the framers of the United
Nations Charter, by inserting one provision which expressly
reserves a right of self-defense, had the intent of imposing by this
provision new limitations upon the traditional right of states. In
fact, Professor Bowett summarizes, the preparatory work suggests
only that the article should safeguard the right of self-defense, not
restrict it.81
There are scholars, however, who argue that self-defense should
only be invoked in cases of actual physical attack.8 2 The right of an-
76. D. BOWET-r, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (1958). Bowett further
states, "this element is predominant in the writings of the early jurists and is clearly essential if
self-defence is to be regarded as a legal concept. The breach of duty violates a substantive
right, for example the right of territorial integrity, and gives rise to the right of self-defence."
Id.
77. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 257.
78. Id. (quoting WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 299 (1904)).
79. "Common sense dictates that it is unrealistic to expect a state to wait until an actual
armed attack has occurred before taking steps to defend itself." Comment, Some Comments
on the "Quarantine" of Cuba, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 592, 595 (1963).
80. See, e.g., L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS 344 (3d. rev. ed. 1969).
81. Comment, The Soviet-Cuban "Quarantine"and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597,
599 (1963).
82. H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 797-98 (1950).
[T]he Charter restricts the right of self-defence by stipulating that the right applies
only against 'an armed attack,' and only as long as the Security Council 'has not
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.' It is of
importance to note that Article 51 does not use the term 'aggression' but the much
narrower concept of 'armed attack,' which means that a merely 'imminent' attack or
any act of aggression which has not the character of an attack involving the use of
1989]
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ticipatory self-defense has recently been criticized on three grounds.8 3
First, the nation asserting its right to self-defense may not be able to
reasonably determine that the alleged aggressive nation is planning an
attack.8 4 However, many factors can be taken into account in order
to determine whether anticipatory self-defense is reasonable: recent
deployment of armed forces, diplomatic relations between the nations
involved, statements made by government officials and the degree of
tension between the nations involved are factors that can be used to
decide reasonableness. Second, the nation invoking anticipatory self-
defense may not follow the Rule of Proportionality due to an inability
to determine the amount of force the alleged aggressor plans to use.85
In order for the unilateral use of force to be legitimate, it must be
proportional to the threat imposed. 6 The force employed must be
comparable to the coercion posed by the alleged aggressor.8 7 In order
to decide whether the magnitude and intensity of the self-defense is
proportional, all relevant factors must be considered. 88 These factors
go beyond a mere analysis of the "qualitative similarity or dissimilar-
ity of the weapons employed by one and the other contending partici-
pant."8 9 Furthermore, it is implicit in the Rule of Proportionality
that the objectives sought to be protected must be permissible goals of
self-defense. 90 Third, the nation invoking anticipatory self-defense
armed force does not justify resort to force as a exercise of the right established by
Article 51.
Id.
83. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 258-60.
84. Id. at 258-60.
85. Id.
86. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 70, at 217-18.
87. Id. at 241.
The principal reference here is to the degree of intensity and scope exhibited in this
coercion-factors long recognized to be of special relevance in judgments about the
lawfulness of particular claims to self-defense. It is primarily in terms of its magni-
tude and intensity-the consequentiality of its effects-that alleged responding coer-
cion must be examined for its 'proportionality.' 'Proportionality' which, like
Inecessity,' is customarily established as a prerequisite for characterizing coercion as
lawful defense, is sometimes described in terms of a required relation between the
alleged initiating coercion and the supposed responding coercion: the (quantum of)
responding coercion must, in rough approximation, be reasonably related or compa-
rable to the (quantum of) initiating coercion.
Id.
88. Id. at 243-44.
89. Id. at 244.
90. Id. at 241-42.
It is useful to make completely explicit that concealed in this shorthand formulation
of the requirement of proportionality are references to both the permissible objectives
of self-defense and the condition of necessity that evoked the response in coercion.
Proportionality in coercion constitutes a requirement that responding coercion be
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will not be motivated to seek a peaceful settlement of the dispute be-
cause it will resolve its dispute through force.
It should be noted that the above rules of anticipatory self-de-
fense apply to vessels on the high seas and are not restricted to the use
of military force on land. Thus, ships on the high seas have a right to
use military force to protect themselves against attack, to keep the
shipping sea-lanes open for free navigation and to prevent the forceful
closure of the sea-lanes. "It seems clear that vessels on the open sea
may use force proportionate to the threat offered to repel attack by
other vessels, or by aircraft. This right must rest on general principles
whether the analogy of vessel and state territory is accepted or not." 91
Furthermore, the analogy that the use of military force as self-
defense and in response to the armed-attack of another nation consti-
tutes war is unsupported by international law. As Justice Jackson
stated: "[the] exercise of the right of legitimate self-defense--that is
to say, resistance to an act of aggression ... shall not constitute a war
of aggression."' 92
E. Application of International Law to Military Actions taken
by the United States in the Persian Gulf
between 1987 and 1988
1. An Act of Self-Defense
The attack of the Iran Ajr provides a factual setting to apply
abstract principles of international law in analyzing United States pol-
icy in the Persian Gulf. There must be grounds for the use of military
force in order to justify a nation's use of force as self-defense.93 As
noted above, if a nation reacts with military force to another nation's
initial use of force, then there are grounds for the use of force.94 Ku-
wait approached the United States and requested military protection
of eleven Kuwaiti vessels. 95 Furthermore, in the spring of 1984 the
limited in intensity and magnitude to what is reasonably necessary promptly to se-
cure the permissible objectives of self-defense. For present purposes, these objectives
may be most comprehensively generalized as the conserving of important values by
compelling the opposing participant to terminate the condition which necessitates
responsive coercion.
Id.
91. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 305.
92. Id. at 252 (quoting Justice Jackson, American Chief Prosecutor before the Nurem-
berg Tribunal).
93. Combacau, supra note 35, at 20.
94. Id. at 20-22.
95. Armacost, supra note 9, at 79.
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United Nations Security Council passed a resolution calling for the
protection of vessels sailing the Persian Gulf.9 6 The United States did
not initiate its program of escorting shipping and of providing mili-
tary protection until 130 ships were attacked.97
The United States reacted to Iran's mine laying activities in the
Persian Gulf. As President Reagan stated in his letter to the Congress
concerning the Iran Ajr incident: "[tihis hostile action [the laying of
mines in the Persian Gulf] posed a direct threat to the safety of United
States warships and other United States flag vessels. Accordingly,
acting in self-defense and pursuant to standing Peacetime Rules of
Engagement..." the United States engaged in a military attack upon
the Iran Ajr.98
Military force must only be used to repulse the assailant to sat-
isfy the second element necessary to invoke the principles of self-de-
fense.99 Through its presence in the Persian Gulf, the United States
sought to keep the "freedom of navigation [open] for nonbelligerent
shipping in and through the gulf, in line with our worldwide policy of
keeping sea-lanes open."100 The aim of the United States was and is
to protect ships flying the flag of the United States as they sail through
the Persian Gulf.1 01
Iran may argue that the United States naval task force was only
present in the Persian Gulf to export and protect the political and
economic interest of the United States and not to ensure the freedom
of navigation. This claim may have limited validity. The United
States was safeguarding its strategic interest and attempting to ensure
that the Persian Gulf region did not come under the control of powers
hostile to the United States. 102 The United States was also protecting
its economic interest through the military task force present in the
Persian Gulf. 103 In addition, the United States was preserving its rela-
tions with friendly gulf states in order to minimize Soviet influence.10 4
96. Id.
97. Statement by Assistant Secretary of State Murphy, supra note 2, at 60.
98. Letter from President Reagan to the Congress of the United States, (Sept. 4, 1987), 87
Dep't St. Bull., No. 2128, at 44, (Nov. 1987) [hereinafter Letter from President Reagan].
99. Combacau, supra note 35, at 25.
100. Armacost, supra note 9, at 78.
101. Statement of Assistant Secretary of State Murphy, supra note 2, at 60.
102. Schloesser, supra note 49, at 38.
103. Id. "[W]e have a vital and unquestionable economic stake in ensuring that oil flows
unimpeded from the gulf to the free world, both now and in the future." Id. at 39.
104. Id. "Our policies have long been aimed at promoting regional security and stability
while assisting our friends in their resistance to increased Soviet influence and presence." Id.
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However, these objectives were not the primary aims pursued by the
United States. The military presence of the United States Navy was
expanded when Kuwait requested United States assistance and only
after Iran initiated its mining program. Thus, under these circum-
stances, the main objective of the United States was to provide United
States vessels with a shield of self-defense. 105
The fact that the United States did not attack or retaliate against
Iran for Iran's attack on a Kuwaiti owned, but Liberian flagged, su-
pertanker on October 15, 1987 indicated that the United States was
only protecting vessels. 1°6 Since the supertanker was not flying the
flag of the United States and it was not in international waters, the
United States was not permitted under international law to use force
against Iran in the name of self-defense.
In order for the use of force to be justified as self-defense, the
reacting nation must use force which is proportional to the force used
by the aggressor. The force must not be unreasonable or excessive in
relation to the aggressor's force. For example, in the Iran Ajr inci-
dent, the United States only attempted to prevent Iran from placing
underwater mines in sea-lanes. 0 7 Consequently, the United States
did not endeavor to sink the Iran Ajr, but only attempted to disable
the ship. 108 This use of force could be construed as reasonable in rela-
tion to Iran's mine laying activities.
The United States attacked the Iran Ajr in two military opera-
tions. 1°9 After witnessing the Iran Ajr laying underwater contact
mines in the Persian Gulf, two United States helicopters operating off
the USS Jarrett attacked the Iran Ajr.10 After this initial attack, the
Iran Ajr resumed deployment of underwater contact mines in interna-
tional waters."1  It was not until after the Iran Ajr continued to de-
ploy underwater contact mines did the United States disable the Iran
Ajr. Furthermore, the United States did not board the Iran Ajr until
September 22, 1987, the next day. 12
105. It should also be noted that the United States is seeking to prevent the expansion of
Iran's 1979 revolution to the moderate states of the Persian Gulf. Interview of Richard W.
Murphy, Meet the Press, (Aug. 23, 1987) by C. Wallace, R.W. Apple and R. Reeves, reprinted
in 87 Dep't. S. Bull., No. 2127, at 45 (Oct. 1987).
106. N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1987, at 1, col. 5.
107. Watson, supra note 14, at 24.
108. Id.
109. Letter from President Reagan, supra note 98, at 44.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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Thus, the attack on the Iran Ajr by the United States was a justi-
fied and legal act under the rules of international law because the
United States satisfied all the necessary elements of self-defense before
resorting to the use of military force in order to protect its rights.
2. Anticipatory Attack
The history of the Iran-Iraq War and attacks upon neutral ves-
sels indicated that Iran was determined to frustrate the freedom of
navigation in the Persian Gulf. Iran constructed military facilities,
armed with Chinese-made Silkworm anti-ship missiles, along the nar-
row Strait of Hormuz where it could attack vessels sailing through
that passage. 13 "These missiles with warheads three times larger
than other Iranian weapons, can range the strait. They could severely
damage or sink a large oil tanker or perhaps scare shippers from going
through the [Strait of Hormuz], leading to a de facto closure."
'1 14
Under these circumstances, could a nation have conducted a pre-
emptive military strike to destroy the deployment site armed with
Chinese-made Silkworm missiles, located on the mainland of Iran and
near the Strait of Hormuz, in order to pass freely?
Every nation has the right to pass freely through the straits with-
out any interference.'15 If there was a de jure closure of the Strait of
Hormuz by Iran or another nation, the United States would be justi-
fied in using military force to re-open that passage in order to invoke
its right of freedom of navigation.'
6
It should be noted, however, that the use of force as an anticipa-
tory means of self-defense has been condemned by the Security Coun-
cil of the United Nations, but the condemnation may result from the
finding that the nation invoking the right to anticipatory attack was
not in imminent danger.
117
Before a nation may use military force in an anticipatory man-
ner, the nation using such force must be able to reasonably determine
that the alleged aggressive nation is planning an attack. The facts of
the Iran-Iraq War, however, indicated that international commerce
was not only in imminent danger, but was actually under attack.
Iran's assaults upon neutral vessels indicated that the Silkworm mis-
113. Armacost, supra note 9, at 79.
114. Id.
115. Wainwright, supra note 52, at 377.
116. Id. at 378-79.
117. Combacau, supra note 35, at 24-25.
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siles near the Strait of Hormuz posed an imminent threat to non-bel-
ligerent shipping. These are anti-ship missiles, and they are located in
an area where their only logical purpose would be to destroy shipping.
Iran gained access to Chinese Silkworm land-to-ship missiles, which
contain 1,100 pounds of explosives, and are one of the most successful
and powerful anti-ship missiles in the world."" These missiles are
capable of sinking any merchant vessel while such ships transit the
Strait of Hormuz.' 1 9 As of October 31, 1987,120 Iran had seventy-five
such missiles. 121
The range of the Silkworm missiles located near the Strait of
Hormuz could not assist Iran in its war against Iraq because the Silk-
worm missiles could not strike Iraq's mainland1 22 and Iraq did not
use the Persian Gulf to export its oil during its war with Iran. Iraq
exported its oil through pipelines and overland transportation
through Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Yet, Iran continuously used Silk-
worm missiles on neutral vessels. This is evidence that Iran intended
to employ these missiles near the Strait of Hormuz for that purpose.
Furthermore, Iran used Silkworm missiles to facilitate its attacks
throughout the Persian Gulf. For example, on October 16, 1987, Iran
attacked a Kuwaiti oil tanker (Sea Isle City) in Kuwaiti territorial
waters. The tanker was under protection of the United States until
the tanker reached Kuwaiti territorial waters. 23 Iran used a Chinese-
made Silkworm missile to facilitate the attack. 24 The attack blinded
the American Captain of the Sea Isle City, and seventeen crew mem-
bers were injured in the incident.
125
It is important to note, however, that Iran did not use and has
yet to use these missiles on vessels passing through the strait. These
missiles may have served as a deterrent to Iraqi shipping and not as a
deterrent for all neutral vessels. Until Iran uses these Silkworms lo-
cated on the Strait of Hormuz against neutral vessels, it may not be
reasonable to infer that Iran has deployed its Silkworm missiles near
the Strait of Hormuz to attack neutral shipping.
Any preemptive strike by the United States must be within the
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Schloesser, supra note 49, at 39.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. The Silkworm Route, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 24, 1987, at 50.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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Rule of Proportionality. One component of proportionality is the ne-
cessity of defining the objectives a nation seeks to protect through the
use of anticipatory coercion. 126 The second component demands that
the coercion employed as anticipatory force must be equal to the
threat posed. The strike could only inflict damage at the missile site
and could not inflict any damage in civilian areas. In other words,
any preemptive military strike must be narrowly designed to destroy
only the missile silos armed with Silkworm missiles.
The various exercises of military strength by the United States
between 1987 and 1988 indicated that the United States was prepared
to use limited force and comply with customary international law.
For example, after Iran's attack on the Sea Isle City, the United States
retaliated against Iran. 27 On October 19, 1987, the United States
destroyed two Iranian oil installations situated in international wa-
ters. 28 The oil installations were also used by Iran as bases for as-
saults on shipping; 29 nonetheless, the United States gave the
occupants a twenty minute warning before attacking the platforms.13
0
The nation using anticipatory force must also seek peaceful ave-
nues in an attempt to alleviate tensions between itself and the threat-
ening nation. The United States continued to seek peaceful avenues
for the settlement of the Iran-Iraq War and for the removal of the
Silkworm missiles from the Strait of Hormuz area. The United States
worked for a negotiated settlement of the Iran-Iraq War through the
United Nations Security Council. Through these efforts the United
126. "Proportionality in coercion constitutes a requirement that responding coercion be
limited in intensity and magnitude to what is reasonably necessary promptly to secure the
permissible objectives of self-defense." McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 70, at 242.
127. This attack could also be viewed as anticipatory self-defense to prevent Iran from
using the platforms to facilitate Iranian attacks on non-belligerent vessels in the future. The
military forces located on these platforms monitored the movement of United States convoys
by radar, assisted small vessel attacks against non-belligerent shipping, coordinated mine lay-
ing in the path of United States convoys and fired at United States military aircraft. Secretary
Weinberger's Statement (Oct. 19, 1987), 87 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2129, at 74 (Dec. 1987). The
United States has also complied with the United Nations Charter concerning this incident.
U.S. Letter to the UN. Security Council (Oct. 19, 1987), 87 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2129, at 74
(Dec. 1987).
In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I [Vernon A.
Walters] wish, on behalf of my government [United States], to report that U.S. forces
have exercised the inherent right of self-defense under international law by taking
defensive action in response to attacks by the Islamic Republic of Iran against U.S.
vessels in the Persian Gulf.
Id.
128. The Silkworm Route, supra note 123, at 50.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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States sought to provide for "independence and territorial integrity"
of both Iran and Iraq. 13' The United States supported several efforts
by the Nonaligned Movement and the Organization of the Islamic
Conference.132 The United States called upon both Iran and Iraq to
cease fire immediately, withdraw to their pre-war borders and to be-
gin negotiations.' 33 Additionally, the United States pursued diplo-
matic channels in an attempt to convince the Chinese not to sell
Silkworm missiles and to persuade Iran to remove these missiles from
the Strait of Hormuz area.
134
It was not completely reasonable to conclude that Iran deployed
Silkworm missiles near the Strait of Hormuz in an effort to close the
strait to neutral ships. Hence, anticipatory self-defense was not a fea-
sible alternative for the United States. However, if Iran uses these
Silkworm missiles in the future to attack neutral vessels and Iran fails
to settle its differences with neutral nations in a peaceful manner, the
United States, or any nation threatened by these missiles, may con-
duct a preemptive military attack and destroy Silkworm missile sites
located near the Strait of Hormuz. Such force must be in proportion
to the threat posed; it must not promote geo-political interest, it must
be limited to the missile silos and it must seek to minimize civilian
casualties.
PART II: THE PRESIDENT'S POWER TO USE ARMED FORCES OF
THE UNITED STATES
The United States Constitution designates the President as
"Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual
Service of the United States."' 35 The Commander-in-Chief Clause
provides the President with the authority to use the armed forces of
the United States "to execute the laws, to maintain peace, and to re-
sist foreign invasion....
The Executive Branch was delegated the power to command the
armed forces of the United States because the President can best util-
131. Schlosser, supra note 49, at 38.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 41.
134. Id.
135. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
136. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 11 (1987).
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ize the armed forces in times of invasion or insurrection. 137 Although
the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief are not un-
restricted,13 8 he is not bound to wait for legislative action before em-
ploying military force when the United States is attacked. 139 The
Framers sought to distribute the war powers equally between the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches.140 As the Supreme Court remarked
in In Re Neagle,'14 the President may use the armed forces of the
United States without an act of Congress. 142 Furthermore, the degree
of military force used by the President is within his discretion.4 3 "It
is equally settled that it is constitutionally proper-indeed inevita-
ble-that the President can use or threaten to use the armed forces
without any action by Congress both in support of his diplomacy and
in situations where international law justifies the limited and propor-
137. Id.
138. Congress has the power: "To declare war," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; "To raise
and support Armies," id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12; "To provide and maintain a Navy," id. art. I, § 8,
cl. 13; "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," id.
art. I, § 8, cl. 14; and "To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions," id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
139. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863).
140. Although the Constitution has distributed the war powers among the executive and
legislative branches, Congress' war powers are limited in scope and exceptions to the executive
powers delegated to the President. THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 432-89 (H.
Lodge ed. 1903).
It deserves to be remarked that as the participation of the Senate in the making of
treaties, and the power of the legislature to declare war, are exceptions out of the
general 'executive power' vested in the President, they are to be construed strictly,
and ought to be extended no further than is essential to their execution.
Id. at 437-43.
141. 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
142. Id. at 64. The Supreme Court posed the question:
Is this duty that the laws be faithfully executed] limited to the enforcement of
acts of Congress or of treaties of the United States according to their express terms,
or does it include the rights, duties and obligations growing out of the Constitution
itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the
government under the Constitution?
Id. In its response, the Supreme Court made clear that the Executive Branch could use the
military forces of the United States in carrying out its duties without prior approval by Con-
gress. Id.
143. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863), indicate how much freedom of move-
ment the President is allowed. The facts surrounding the Prize Cases, however, are different
from the facts surrounding United States action in the Persian Gulf. In the former, President
Lincoln authorized a blockade of Southern ports following the attack upon Fort Sumter in
1861. President Lincoln was responding to an invasion of the United States. Nevertheless, the
reasoning of the Prize Cases can be applied to the situation in the Persian Gulf. The United
States Navy is responding to attacks upon United States military vessels that have been in the
Persian Gulf for over forty years. Under international law a flagged vessel is similar to the
territory of the nation the flag represents. Id.
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tional use of force in times of peace in order to deal with forceful
breaches of international law by another state."
144
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer the Supreme Court held
that the President's power to use the armed forces must stem from the
Constitution or from Congress. 145 In his concurring opinion, Justice
Frankfurter argued that the executive power is vested in the President
of the United States, but the executive powers are not enumerated and
144. Rostow, "Once More Unto the Breach:" the War Powers Resolution Revisited, 21
VAL. U.L. REV. 1, 17 (1986).
145. 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952). Under the facts of Youngstown President Truman seized
steel mills operating in the United States. Congress did not authorize the seizure and President
Truman based his action on all the powers vested in the President by the Constitution and by
the Commander-in-Chief Clause of art. II, § 2, cl. 1. At the time the order was issued the
United States was engaged in the Korean War. In December, 1951, the steel companies and
their employees failed to come to a collective bargaining agreement. The United Steelworkers
of America, C.I.O, intended to go on strike on April 10, 1952. President Truman directed the
Secretary of Commerce to seize the steel mills to assure the availability of steel that would be
necessary to support United States Armed Forces in the Korean War. The Supreme Court
held that the Commander-in-Chief Clause did not delegate to the President the power to seize
the steel mills in order to support the war effort. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. The Court
further held that the President's power to see that the laws be faithful executed refutes the idea
that he is to be a law maker. Id.
In concurrence, Justice Douglas noted that the President can act more quickly than Con-
gress in a national emergency. Id. at 629. However, simply because the President can act
more efficiently than Congress, the executive branch can not act in a way that the Constitution
does not authorize. Id.
In concurrence with the majority, Justice Jackson held that the powers that are delegated
to the President and Congress "are not fixed but fluctuate." Id. at 635. When the President
acts under an implied or express authorization of Congress, his power is the strongest. Id.
When the President acts in absence of a grant or denial or authorization by Congress it is
uncertain whether the President's action is valid and the President must rely on his own pow-
ers. Id. at 637. When the President acts in a way that is incompatible with Congress the
President's "power is at its lowest ebb." Id. Under this analysis, President Reagan's use of
force in the Persian Gulf falls within the third category. Therefore, President Reagan's actions
can "be supported only by any remainder of executive power after subtraction of such powers
as Congress may have over the subject." Id. at 640. The President's use of military force is
valid if that right is within his "domain" and beyond control of Congress. Id. Justice Jackson
noted that the Commander-in-Chief Clause does not authorize the President to seize private
property to support the armed forces. Id. at 643. "He has no monopoly of 'war powers,'
whatever they are. While Congress cannot deprive the President of the Command of the army
and navy, only Congress can provide him an army and navy to command." Id. at 644.
It is important, however, to note that Justice Jackson distinguishes the President's power
under the Commander-in-Chief Clause when he uses his powers in the domestic arena versus
in the foreign arena. "I should indulge the widest latitude of interpretation to sustain his
exclusive function to command the instruments of national force, at least when turned against
the outside world for the security of our society. But, when it is turned inward, not because of
rebellion but because of a lawful economic struggle between industry and labor, it should no
such indulgence." Id. at 645.
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may be developed over time.146 Justice Frankfurter used a structural
accommodation argument indicating that the powers delegated to the
executive and legislative branches may be interpreted through execu-
tive powers historically claimed by past Presidents, and by the con-
duct of past Chief Executives. Justice Frankfurter noted Justice
Marshall's often cited phrase: "[I]t is a Constitution we are ex-
pounding upon."' 147 As Justice Frankfurter further stated:
To be sure, the content of the three authorities of government is
not to be derived from an abstract analysis. The areas are partly
interacting, not wholly disjointed. The Constitution is a frame-
work for government. Therefore the way the framework has con-
sistently operated fairly establishes that it has operated according
to its true nature. Deeply embedded traditional ways of con-
ducting government cannot supplant the Constitution or legisla-
tion, but they give meaning to the words of a text or supply them.
It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional
law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard
the gloss which life has written upon them. In short, a systematic,
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the
Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents
who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution making as it were
such exercise of power part of the structure of our government,
may be treated as a gloss on "executive Power" vested in the Presi-
dent by Section 1 of Art. II. .... 148
Thus, a particular course of action that has been repeatedly and sys-
tematically pursued by Presidents of the United States may be used as
a means and guide to interpret what powers the executive branch has
been delegated by the Constitution.
Throughout the history of the United States, Presidents have
used military force to implement American foreign policy and to pro-
tect the national interests abroad. 149 "Congress shares with the Presi-
dent his authority over the armed forces. It supplies the money and
makes regulations for their governance. It has the power to 'declare
war', but the President is able to give orders to the Army, Navy, and Air
Force that may lead to hostilities, as well as to direct our foreign rela-
tions to that end."' 50 President Polk deliberately sent troops into a
146. Id. at 597-98.
147. Id (quoting Justice Marshall, McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819)).
148. Id. at 610-11.
149. E. CORWIN & J. PELTASON, UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 98 (1958).
150. Id. (emphasis added).
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disputed territory which caused the Mexican War; President Theo-
dore Roosevelt deployed the Navy abroad after Congress threatened
to withhold appropriations; President Truman ordered United States
troops into Korea to resist communist aggression; 51 President An-
drew Johnson sent 50,000 troops to the Mexican border, before an act
of Congress, in order to persuade France to withdraw from Mexico.I
5 2
Furthermore, the armed forces of the United States have been used
abroad more than two hundred times since 1789, but Congress has
only declared war on five occasions.
5 3
The Barbary Coast Crisis of 1801 to 1805 is one example where
the President of the United States used military force abroad and en-
gaged in a military action with foreign troops. More importantly, the
Barbary Coast Crisis of 1801 to 1805 is analogous to the situation in
the Persian Gulf. The United States Navy was deployed in both cases
to protect United States shipping in international waters. By analyz-
ing the debates that took place in 1797 concerning the President's
power to deploy the armed forces, one can better understand the orig-
inal interpretation'5 4 of the Commander-in-Chief Clause and the
President's powers under that clause in circumstances similar to the
Persian Gulf crisis. Furthermore, past implementation of presidential
powers under the Commander-in-Chief Clause provides a means to
interpret the Clause under Justice Frankfurter's "gloss on Executive
151. Id.
152. Bancrof, The French in Mexico and the Monroe Doctrine, 2 POL. Sci. Q. 30 (1896).
153. J. ROGERS, WORLD POLICING AND THE CONSTITUTION 46-47 (1945); see also A.
SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER, THE ORIGINS (1976); Ja-
vits, War Powers Reconsidered, 64 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 130 (1985).
154. The Supreme Court has recognized that original intent analysis is suspect. Home
Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934). As was stated by the Court:
If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it
means to-day, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be
confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of
their time, would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own refutation. It
was to guard against such a narrow conception that Chief Justice Marshall uttered
the memorable warning-"We must never forget that it is a Constitution we are ex-
pounding" (McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819))-"a con-
stitution intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs." Id. at 415. When we are dealing with the words of
the Constitution, said this Court in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920),
"we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which
could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetter.... The
case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely
in that of what was said a hundred years ago."
Id. Some scholars have argued that one cannot determine the Framers' intent because there is
no such thing as original intent. See Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 469,
477 (1981).
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Power" analysis. 155
A. Barbary Coast Crisis of 1797 to 1805
During the latter part of the Nineteenth and early Twentieth cen-
turies, the Barbary Coast States in the Mediterranean Sea were havens
for pirates who attacked international commerce. The United States
in the late 1790's paid an annual tribute to the rulers of the Barbary
States. The Barbary States then granted vessels from the United
States immunity from the Barbary States piratical acts. 156 In 1801,
the United States refused to pay an increased tribute to the Bashaw of
Tripoli, so the latter declared war against the United States on June
10, 1801.157 On February 6, 1802, Congress authorized President Jef-
ferson to employ the armed forces of the United States as he deemed
necessary to protect commerce and trade in the Atlantic Ocean and
Mediterranean Sea.1 58 Congress further authorized the President to
seize and make prizes of all vessels belonging to the Beg of Tripoli. 5 9
However, on December 12, 1801, two months before Congress
took action against the Barbary Coast states and before Congress au-
thorized President Jefferson to use military force against Tripoli, Pres-
ident Jefferson ordered the United States Navy to the Mediterranean
Sea to insure that commerce would not be interrupted. 16° Although
President Jefferson's action was intended to maintain peace against
threatened attack by the Barbary States, 161 the United States Navy
engaged in acts of hostilities with Tripolitan military vessels. 162 The
United States captured a Tripolitan vessel and inflicted casualties
upon its crew. 163 President Jefferson recognized that he only had the
power to deploy military vessels to insure the freedom of navigation
and to act in self-defense against any threatened attack upon United
States military vessels or commercial vessels, but that he was not em-
powered by the Constitution to take offensive steps. As President Jef-
ferson stated to Congress:
155. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 638 (1863).
156. J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897 633
(1901).
157. Id.
158. Act for the protection of the Commerce and Seamen of the United States, against the
Tripolitan Cruisers, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 126, 129 (1802).
159. Id. § 2.
160. J. RICHARDSON, supra note 156, at 326-27.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 327.
163. Id.
[V/ol. 11:171
Policing the Persian Gulf
Our commerce in the Mediterranean was blockaded and that of the
Atlantic in peril. The arrival of our squadron dispelled the danger.
One of the Tripolitan cruisers having fallen in with and engaged
the small schooner Enterprise, commanded by Lieutenant Sterret,
which had gone as a tender to our larger vessels, was captured,
after a heavy slaughter of her men, without the loss of a single one
on our part. The bravery exhibited by our citizens on that element
will, I trust, be a testimony to the world that it is not the want of
that virtue which makes us seek their peace, but a conscientious
desire to direct the energies of our nation to the multiplication of
the human race, and not to its destruction. Unauthorized by the
Constitution, without the sanction of Congress, to go beyond the
line of defense, the vessel, being disabled from committing further
hostilities, was liberated with its crew .... I communicate all ma-
terial information on this subject, that in the exercise of this impor-
tant function confided by the Constitution to the Legislature
exclusively their judgment may form itself on a knowledge and
consideration of every circumstance of weight.' 64
The importance of the above analysis indicates that the Framers
interpreted the Constitution to empower the President to deploy
United States armed forces in situations similar to the Persian Gulf
crisis of 1986 through 1987 and to engage, in the name of self-defense,
in hostilities with foreign nations without a declaration of war from
Congress. Congressional debate over what course of action was avail-
able to the President in the Barbary Coast Crisis indicates that the
Framers of the Constitution intended the Commander-in-Chief
Clause to vest in the President the power to use the armed forces of
the United States to protect shipping. Furthermore, the debate indi-
cates that the system of "checks and balances" which the Constitu-
tion sought to establish was not disrupted by presidential use of
armed forces to protect commercial shipping. The debate concerned
whether Congress may specify the way the President could use frig-
ates commissioned by Congress to be employed against the Barbary
Coast States.
Congressman Gallatin argued that normally the President would
not be restricted in the use of naval forces, but since there was the
potential of war he would be so restricted.' 6 However, Congressman
164. Id.
165. House of Representatives, Protection of Trade 22 June 1797, reprinted in 4 THE
FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION 8 (1987).
Mr. Sewall was in favor of striking out the clause [limiting the use of the three frig-
ates]. If the President were to be limited at all he should have no objection to limit
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Sewall argued that Congress could not limit the President's power in
the Mediterranean Sea.1 66 Likewise, Congressman Harper asserted
that Congress did not have the authority to tell the President how to
use force. 167 If the President abused his power, then the responsibility
was his.168 Harper's argument indicates that there were other checks
upon the President, and that Congress did not have to provide a
check in this situation. 169 For example, if the President abused his
authority, he would pay for his abuse of power at election time. Con-
gressman Otis argued that it was not convenient for Congress to au-
thorize how the President used military force because such a
restriction would not enable the President to act quickly and in de-
fense of American interest.
70
The Barbary Coast Crisis of 1801 to 1805 is almost identical to
the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1987 to 1988. In both situations the Presi-
dents sought to insure the freedom of navigation on the high seas
through the use of the United States Armed Forces. Congress did not
give prior approval for the use of such military action. The United
States engaged in military battles with foreign navies in which foreign
vessels were destroyed and foreign military personnel were captured,
and the United States was attacked first and reacted in a defensive
manner.
B. Congress Has the Power to Declare War, Not to Declare
How Military Force May be Used Prior
To A Declaration of War
Congress' power to declare war checks the President's war pow-
him with respect to convoys, from the incompetency of three vessels to that end; but
these frigates were to be considered as the public force, as the navy of the United
States. It was true, it was a small one; but it was such as Congress had thought
proper to raise, and put in the power of the President.
Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 9. "The use of this force must be left to the President; if he abuses it, upon his
own head would lie the responsibility .. " Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
Mr. O[tis] did not say that Congress had not a right to designate the object of this
force; but he believed it would not be convenient; for, said he, suppose either of the
Barbary States were to declare war against us [sic]. (and they all knew there was no
certain reliance upon their observance of treaties,) should not the President have a
right to send those vessels into the Mediterranean? Or, suppose we wanted to send
an Ambassador to a foreign country, or despatches [sic] to our Minister residing
there, shall we, said he, limit his power in his respect?
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ers under the Commander-in-Chief Clause.1 71 However, the power to
declare war does not mean that Congress has the power to declare
how the President may use military force short of a declaration of
war. to declare War is different and separate from using military force
in a way which may resemble a state of war. The Framers' debate
over whether Congress should have the power to make war, as it was
empowered by the Articles of Confederation, or whether Congress
should only have power to declare war illustrates the unique responsi-
bilities vested in the power to declare war. The power to make war
implies the power to engage military forces in hostilities. The framers
recognized that the President should have this power under the Con-
stitution because the executive branch has the unique qualities re-
quired in making decisions on whether to deploy the Armed Forces of
the United States.
Mr. Butler. The Objections ag[ain]st the Legislature lie in a
great degree ag[ain]st the Senate. He was for vesting the power in
the President, who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not
make war but when the Nation will support it.
Mr. M < adison> and Mr. Gerry moved to insert "declare,"
striking out "make" war; leaving to the Executive the power to
repel sudden attacks...
Mr. Sharman thought it stood very well. The Executive
sh[oul]d be able to repel and not to commence war. "Make" better
than "declare" the latter narrowing the power too much.
Mr. Gerry never expected to hear in a republic a motion to
empower the Executive alone to declare war.
172
The consequences of a declaration of war are much more serious
than the consequences 73 of using military force.' 74 A declaration of
171. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1.
172. G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 424
(1986) [hereinafter STONE & SEIDMAN].
173. In October, 1987, the United States applied new sanctions. It prohibited the export of
the following items: mobile communications equipment; boats, including inflatable boats; off-
highway wheel tractors; large diesel engines; nonstrategic aircraft parts and components; port-
able electric generators; all marine engines; other naval equipment; underwater photographic
equipment; submersible systems; pressured aircraft breathing equipment; sonar navigation
equipment; electronic test equipment; and cryptographic equipment. U.S. Imposes Trade
Measures Against Iran, White House Fact Sheet (Oct. 26, 1987) 87 Dep't. S. Bull., No. 2129, at
75-76 (Dec. 1987). However, these items are limited to equipment Iran uses in its attacks.
174. William Rawle argued that the President engages in war before Congress declares
war. This brings together as one entity acts of aggression and declarations of war as one entity.
However, Rawle further stated that "[wiar should always be avoided as long as possible, and
although it may happen to be brought on us... without the previous assent of Congress, yet a
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war completely interrupts all commercial interaction between the
warring nations, 175 and all contracts of commercial dealings with the
enemy. 76 Moreover, all the enemy's ships in the United States' ports
are detained and the property is confiscated;177 United States citizens
are forbidden to trade with the enemy and may not bring the enemy's
products into the United States. 78 Arguably, the Framers realized
that a declaration of war should only take place after full considera-
tion and consultation because of these serious consequences. This is
what the power to declare war seeks to achieve. It did not seek to
prevent the President from using military forces short of a declaration
of war. Furthermore, the distinction made between a "declaration of
war" and a use of force in time of peace is supported by international
law. 179
There is the argument that certain acts, such as capturing and
detaining military personnel of another nation, are acts of war. This
argument further holds that the President is not authorized to commit
these acts of war without a declaration of war by Congress. However,
some framers argued that the "To declare war" clause was not
designed to frustrate the President's freedom in using military force.
Alexander Hamilton argued it is an "absurdity" that the President
may not use military force to "seize the property of the enemy" with-
out a declaration of war, but has to restrict the use of force to only
regular and formal war should never be entered into, without the united approbation of the
whole legislature." W. RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
109-11 (2d ed. 1829), reprinted in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 119-20 (1987).
175. J. KENT, COMMENTARIES 53-67 (1826), reprinted in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITU-
TION 118 (1987).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Rostow, supra note 144, at 6:
The phrase 'to declare war' in the Constitution has a specific meaning in interna-
tional law. Under international law, force may be used between states both in time of
war and in time of peace. All international uses of force are not 'war' in the legal
sense of the word, however bloody and extended the conflicts may be. The older
treatises on international law generally appeared in two volumes, one devoted to the
Law of War, the other to the Law of Peace. A 'declaration of war' transforms the
relationship between the belligerents into a state of war and challenges the relation of
non-participants to the belligerents. The state of war contemplates unlimited hostili-
ties between the belligerents, the internment or expulsion of enemy aliens, the termi-
nation of diplomatic relations, the sequestration or even confiscation of enemy
property, and the imposition of regulations-censorship, for example-which would
be unthinkable in liberal-minded states during peacetime.
[Vol. 11:171
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protect the United States.' 80 Congress had the power to declare war,
which means to "go to war."'' But this does not prevent the Presi-
dent from using military force in self-defense or from capturing and
detaining the enemy's property, although the United States has not
declared war.
82
C. War Powers Resolution of 1973
Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution of 1973183 during
the Vietnam War. Congress, under its power to make all laws that
are necessary and proper, 84 attempted to re-define the President's
power under the Commander-in-Chief Clause and Congress' responsi-
bilities when armed forces are introduced into hostilities. 85 The War
Powers Resolution was enacted to prevent a situation similar to the
Vietnam War where the United States was engaged in a war without a
congressional declaration.
186
The War Powers Resolution seeks to allow the President to in-
troduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities only in limited
situations. 87 The President is also required to submit a written report
180. A. Hamilton, The Examination, No. 1, 17 Dec. 1801, Paper 25: 454-57, reprinted in 3
THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 101 (1987).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1973).
184. Id. § 1541(b).
Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the
Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying
into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Con-
stitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer
thereof.
Id.
185. Id. § 1541(a).
It is the purpose of this chapter to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution
of the Untied States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and
the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hos-
tilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indi-
cated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in
such situations.
Id.
186. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F.Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355, cert. de-
nied, 104 S.Ct. 3533(1984).
187. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1973).
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce
United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent in-
volvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only
pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a
national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or posses-
sions, or its armed forces.
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to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate whenever United States Armed Forces are in-
troduced into hostilities or into situations where imminent involve-
ment in hostilities is "clearly indicated by the circumstances."" 8 The
President must inform Congress of the circumstances necessitating
the introduction of armed forces, 89 the constitutional and legislative
authority under which the President introduced the armed forces' 90
and the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involve-
ment. 91 The President must keep Congress fully informed 92 and
provide periodic reports to Congress as long as armed forces of the
United States continue to be engaged in hostilities or in situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is evident. 93 Each report
shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
ate for appropriate action.
194
Congress may compel the President to remove United States
armed forces from hostilities or situations where involvement in hos-
tilities is imminent if Congress passes a concurrent resolution. 95 If
Congress has not passed a joint resolution compelling the removal of
armed forces from hostilities, the President has up to sixty days to
remove those forces unless Congress has: (1) declared war or has
enacted a specific authorization for such use of armed forces; (2) ex-
tended the sixty day period by law; or (3) is physically unable to meet
as a result of an attack upon the United States.' 96
The essence of the War Powers Resolution gives Congress the
power to control United States military involvement in foreign wars.
President Reagan refused to invoke the War Powers Resolution and
maintained that the United States military contingent in the Persian
Id.
188. Id. § 1543(a).
189. Id. § 1543(a)(3)(A).
190. Id. § 1543(a)(3)(B).
191. Id. § 1543(a)(3)(C).
192. Id. § 1543(b).
193. Id. § 1543(c).
194. Id. § 1544(a).
195. Id. § 1544(c).
[A]t any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the
territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of
war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President
if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.
Id.
196. Id. § 1544(b).
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Gulf was not involved in the Iran-Iraq War and was not introduced
into a situation where imminent involvement in hostilities was
"clearly indicated by the circumstances."'' 97 The United States fur-
ther argued that Iran's minelaying activities were attempts to frus-
trate the United States, and Iran did not intend to confront the
United States militarily. 98 Furthermore, the United Nations did not
declare the Persian Gulf a war zone.
Despite this, the nature of the Persian Gulf crisis indicated that
the United States was involved in hostilities. The underwater mines
deployed by Iran could not have sunk an oil-tanker, but these weap-
ons were capable of destroying a military vessel.1 99 Iran laid mines
with the specific intention of interfering with the United States con-
voy. 200 The oil-tankers became the protectors of the United States
vessels, providing a shield against Iranian military attack.20 1 The
United States also engaged in aerial combat with Iran. 20 2 For exam-
ple, in August, 1987, two United States Navy F-14 Tomcats inter-
cepted an Iranian F-4 fighterbomber as it flew near a United States
radar plane patrolling the Persian Gulf. One of the F- 14's fired a pair
of Sparrow missiles at the Iranian F-4 fighterbomber, but did not
make a kill.20 3 The Reagan Administration attempted to cover-up the
incident by denying its occurrence. 20 4 Some critics argued that the
administration attempted to keep the incident a secret to avoid the
impression that the Untied States was engaged in a combat situation,
which would compel President Reagan to invoke the War Powers
Resolution. 20 5 Furthermore, the United States' destruction of the
Iran Ajr and the Iranian oil platforms at Rashadat also indicated that
armed forces of the United States were introduced into hostilities or
197. The United States has argued that the War Powers Act can not be invoked by Con-
gress under the Persian Gulf crisis of 1987-88. Schloesser, supra note 49, at 44.
The War Powers Act is not applicable under the present circumstances-this is not a
situation where imminent involvement of United States forces in hostilities is clearly
indicated. Prior to the attack on the U.S.S. Stark, there had never been an attack on
a United States-escorted vessel in the gulf. The attack on the Stark was evidently the
result of a targeting error rather than a deliberate decision to attack a United States
vessel.
Id.
198. Watson, supra note 6, at 23.
199. Anderson, supra note 3, at 24.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Watson, supra note 6, at 23.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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into a situation where imminent involvement in hostilities was clearly
indicated by the circumstances. These platforms were used by Iran as
a fortress from which Iranian commandos conducted their attacks
upon vessels passing through the Persian Gulf.2°6 On April 14, 1988,
the United States frigate Samuel B. Roberts was crippled by an Ira-
nian planted mine.207 Before the week's end the United States had
destroyed two Iranian oil platforms located in the Persian Gulf and
six Iranian military vessels.208  The United States lost one United
States Marine helicopter and two servicemen.
2
0
9
Under the War Powers Resolution's interpretation, the Com-
mander-in-Chief Clause allows the President to introduce United
States armed forces into hostilities pursuant to: (1) a declaration of
war, (2) specific statutory authorization or (3) a national emergency
created by attack upon the United States, it territories or possessions,
or its armed forces. 210 There was an attack upon the United States
and the armed forces of the United States. Iran placed underwater
mines in sea-lanes that were known to be traveled by the United
States.211 Some United States government officials have argued that
the assault upon the Bridgeton was specifically conducted by Iran.21 2
The placement of underwater mines in sea-lanes is a belligerent attack
upon the United States and all nations using those sea-lanes. In this
sense, the United States was attacked. Iran's assault of the Sea Isle
City is irrefutable evidence that the United States has been victimized
by unwarranted Iranian hostility. 21 3
The War Powers Resolution suggests the Commander-in-Chief
Clause does not give the President a free hand in the use of military
force when those forces are engaged in hostilities in absence of a dec-
laration of war. For example, the President is required to keep Con-
206. A Day in the Gulf, supra note 43, at 15.
207. L.A. Times, Apr. 19, 1988, Part I, at 1 col. 3.
208. Id.
209. L.A. Times, July 4, 1988, Part I, at 9, col. 6.
210. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1973).
211. For example, United States military and intelligence officials determined "conclu-
sively" that the mine which struck the Samuel B. Roberts on April 14, 1988 was deliberately
placed by Iran to strike United States vessels. L.A. Times, Apr. 19, 1988, Part I, at 1, col. 3.
212. Anderson, supra note 3, at 23. However, some government officials claimed that the
Bridgeton struck a randomly floating mine. Id.
213. Although Congress did not statutorily authorize the deployment, such authorization
may be inferred because Congress continued to appropriate funds for financing the Persian
Gulf Task Force. DeCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1153 (2d. Cir. 1973), held that Congress
constitutionally authorized United States involvement in Vietnam by failing to cut off appro-
priations for the conflict's financing.
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gress fully informed as to the circumstances necessitating the
introduction of armed forces. The Executive Branch did keep Con-
gress fully informed as to United States military maneuvers in the
Persian Gulf.214
The Termination Provision of the War Powers Resolution fur-
ther requires that the President terminate the use of United States
armed forces if Congress has not: (1) declared war or has not enacted
a specific authorization for the use of armed forces, (2) has not ex-
tended the sixty day period by law or (3) been physically able to meet
as a result of an armed attack upon the United States.21 5 The consti-
tutionality of this section of the War Powers Resolution is in serious
doubt because the Supreme Court has invalidated the legislative veto
and required compliance with the presentment and bicameralism
clauses of the Constitution.21 6 Congress recognized that this section
may be deemed a legislative veto and included a Separability Clause in
the War Powers Resolution. 21 7 Under the Separability Clause: "If
any provision of this chapter or the application thereof to any person
or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter and the
application of such provision to any other person or circumstance
shall not be affected thereby. '218 President Reagan may not have
been required to remove United States armed forces from the Persian
Gulf because the constitutionality of the Termination Provision of the
War Powers Resolution is highly questionable. 21 9 The courts have
214. Schloesser, supra note 49, at 44.
215. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1973).
216. Weikart, Applying Chada: the Fate of the War Powers Resolution, 24 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 697, 733 (1984) (the author argues that the War Powers Resolution is unconstitu-
tional because it provides Congress with a legislative veto and infringes on the President's
power); Comment, Congressional Control of Presidential War Making under the War Powers
Act: The Status of the Legislative Veto After Chadha, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1217, 1240-41 (1984)
(the author argues if it is deemed that Congress has exclusive control over the war powers and
the War Powers Act does not delegate power to the Executive Branch, then the passage of a
concurrent resolution ordering the end to hostilities would not be unconstitutional under
Chada). But see Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV.
101 (1984) (the author argues that the War Powers Act of 1973 is constitutional and only
seeks to define the word "war" in article I, § 8, clause 11, which grants Congress the power to
declare war. The author also argues that the mechanisms to enforce the War Powers Act are
valid in the face of Chada); Rushdoff, A Defense of the War Powers Resolution, 93 YALE L. J.
1330 (1984) (the author argues that the President can initiate American involvement in hostili-
ties not based on the Commander-in-Chief Clause, which is not subject to congressional re-
strictions, but from a general grant of executive power).
217. 50 U.S.C. § 1548 (1973).
218. Id.
219. The author will not attempt to resolve this question, for that issue is not within the
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been reluctant to render a decision on the constitutionality of the Ter-
mination Provision of the War Powers Resolution. The courts have
held that the War Powers Resolution involves a political question
and, therefore, is not justiciable.220
However, if Congress felt that it was in the best interest of the
United States to remove its armed forces, it should have taken the
initiative and responsibility to pass a concurrent resolution compel-
ling the President to remove the armed forces of the United States
from the Persian Gulf. The War Powers Resolution specifically pro-
vides Congress with the authority to take affirmative steps, by passing
a concurrent resolution, and to compel the removal of United States
armed forces. 22 1 Congress failed to take any action and thereby tac-
itly approved of President Reagan's deployment of armed forces in
the Persian Gulf.
CONCLUSION
All nations have the inherent right to use the high seas freely and
without interference. When this right of free navigation has been
abridged by the violent attacks of another nation, all nations have the
right to use reasonable military force to protect their rights. Under
the United Nations Charter and under customary international law,
all nations also have the right to protect themselves against military
attacks.
The deployment of the United States Navy in the Persian Gulf is
not a new policy. The United States has patrolled the Persian Gulf
for over forty years. The escorting of United States flagged vessels,
the removal of mines located in international waters, the assault on
the Iranian oil platforms and assaults on Iran military forces attack-
ing United States ships were all within the President's powers under
the Commander-in-Chief Clause. Historically, the President has had
a wide latitude of freedom in the use of military forces as long as the
force used is in compliance with international law. The original inter-
pretation of the Constitution intended to empower the President with
this freedom because only the Executive Branch can act quickly and
only that branch has available the expertise of the executive offices to
act with full information.
scope of this article and has been fully addressed by many scholars. See articles identified in
supra note 216.
220. Lowry v. Reagan, No. 87-2196 (D.D.C Dec. 18, 1987).
221. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(c) (1973).
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The War Powers Resolution authorizes the use of armed forces
in the Persian Gulf because the United States has been attacked.
President Reagan was not required to remove United States armed
forces because the Termination Clause of the War Powers Resolution
is highly suspect and may be unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the
question of the constitutionality of the War Powers Act should not be
the main issue. The primary issue in question is whether the United
States and other innocent nations should participate as the willing vic-
tims of unwarranted, non-provoked Iranian hostility. The answer to
this question is an unequivocal no.
This is not such a drastic solution when one considers that the
United States exhausted all diplomatic channels in efforts to alleviate
tensions between itself and Iran. The Iranian government was con-
sistently unresponsive to any peaceful efforts at negotiation. The
President, in keeping with the War Powers Act, kept Congress fully
informed of the situation in the Persian Gulf, but because of Con-
gress' hesitancy to make any decisions regarding the crisis, the Presi-
dent was forced into the difficult position of accepting full
responsibility for any United States military activity in the Gulf. Re-
gardless of whether the responsibility is shared by Congress or not,
these violent and senseless attacks upon innocent vessels were toler-
ated beyond any reasonable point and had to be stopped before more
lives and property were lost. The use of military force is a viable al-
ternative in protecting the freedom of navigation.
Dimitrios P. Biller
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